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ARTICLES

“U Can’t Touch This” Fog Line: the Improper Use of a Fog Line Violation as a
Pretext for Initiating an Unlawful Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure
Harvey Gee ............................................................................................. 1
Fog line litigation is happening all across the country. For years, law
enforcement officers across the country have been initiating traffic stops of
cars on our roadways, based on allegations that the drivers crossed onto a
fog line in violation of a state ordinance prohibiting such conduct. A fog line
is the white line that divides the shoulder from the road. While the legislative
history and language of these fog line statutes reflect their public safety
purpose, the police are relying on statutes as an excuse to pull over cars
which may have only momentarily crossed the fog line and where the drivers
have done nothing else unlawful. This common practice affords police
tremendous leeway to conduct pretextual stops, unreasonably detain
suspects, and unlawfully search vehicles. More often than not, in fog line
cases, even if the court holds that the defendant did not violate a state traffic
law, the government will nevertheless argue that the traffic stop was valid
because the officer’s mistake of law was reasonable, and there was
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. This Essay
explores the mistakes of law committed by police officers during traffic stops,
and argues that the police should not be allowed to use alleged fog line
violations as a pretext for initiating a traffic stop if it cannot be supported by
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Such an unreasonable stop violates
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Illinois Lawyer Investigations of Current Client Concerns
Jeffrey A. Parness ................................................................................... 32
This Article examines the various issues surrounding attorney-client
communication privileges, with a focus on intra law firm communication
protections and how current trends in case law will impact Illinois law.
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Just Because You Can, Doesn’t Mean You Should: Equal Protection, Free
Speech, and Religious Worship
Timothy J. Tracey .......................................................................................... 58
Surveys suggest that about twelve percent of Evangelical Christian churches
assemble for worship each week in local school buildings. Most of these
churches meet Sunday after Sunday without trouble. However, in the last five
years, a handful of school districts have banned Christian churches from
using their facilities for worship services. Most notoriously, New York City
school officials adopted a policy denying access to anyone seeking to use
school space as a “house of worship.” Some of the churches faced with these
bans have responded with legal action. They and their attorneys maintain that
these worship bans violate the First Amendment doctrine of equal access—the
notion that once the government opens its facilities, it must extend access to
religious and nonreligious groups alike.
But this argument is shortsighted. Equal access is rooted in a principle of
equal protection—that the speech proposed by the religious group is
“similarly situated” to the nonreligious speech already permitted by the
government. That means for churches to leverage equal access they must
analogize their weekly worship services to secular speech activities, like pep
rallies and political speeches. Churches certainly can stretch religious
worship to make these comparisons, but, in the process, they strip worship of
its distinct spiritual character. The Swiss theologian, Karl Barth, described
Christian worship as “the most momentous, the most urgent, the most
glorious action that can take place in human life.” No matter how exciting the
football game or how compelling the political candidate, secular expression
will never rise to the level of “momentous,” “urgent,” and “glorious.” For
churches to argue otherwise degrades religious worship.
A far better solution is for churches to challenge worship bans under the Free
Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause, by its very nature, recognizes
religious worship as special—a sui generis form of expression. The clause,
thus, imposes no requirement on churches to equate worship with any other
type of expression. Churches can seek to vindicate their rights while at the
same time preserving the unique character of worship.

“That Justice Shall Be Done”—Constitutional Requirements, Ethical Rules, and the
Professional Ideal of Federal Prosecution
Charles R. Wilson……………………………………………………………………111
Seventy-five years ago, then-Attorney General and subsequent Supreme Court

Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered a speech entitled The Federal Prosecutor.
This Article revisits Jackson’s speech to extract a few insights about ethics and
professional responsibility, specifically with regard to prosecutorial discretion.
Beyond the constitutional and ethical obligations involved in representing the
United States in court, federal prosecutors must continually aspire to a
professional ideal derived from their duty to seek and serve justice. This Article
submits that this professional ideal—as envisioned by Jackson and alluded to by
the Supreme Court—is also applicable to every lawyer as he or she exercises
discretion in the day-to-day practice of law.
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NOTE AND COMMENT
Wrestling With the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine: How Puskar v. Krco
Further Complicated the Heavily Litigated History of the Serbian Orthodox
Church in America
Dan Knudsen ......................................................................................... 139
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a long-held constitutional principle

that prohibits a court from resolving a dispute that is inherently religious in
nature. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine’s practical application
requires a court to either abstain from fact-finding issues that are based on
religious doctrine or church governance, or defer to the decisions handed
down by the church leadership or a hierarchical authority. An implicit
concept within the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is the necessity for there
to be an interchurch dispute—namely, one that is confined to a local church
body or a hierarchically structured religious organization. Since not every
dispute within a church is fundamentally religious, courts are not precluded
from resolving certain church disputes using neutral principles of law. A
neutral property or contract issue may not necessarily impermissibly intrude
on the First Amendment.
This Note examines the Illinois Second District Appellate Court’s
confrontation with the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in the insightful
case of Puskar v. Krco. The majority and dissenting opinions in Puskar
represent the difficulty of adjudicating disagreements when it is unclear
whether a religious question is inescapably intertwined or merely peripheral.
Puskar would have been legally insignificant if the outcome turned solely on
whether an appointed Serbian Orthodox Church bishop owed a duty of
loyalty to the higher appointing authority or the local diocese. However,
before duty of loyalty could be decided, the local diocese, a former affiliate
of the Serbian Church, contested that it had officially reunited with the
hierarchical Serbian Orthodox Church to become re-affiliated. Reunification
was contested because the local diocese and the Serbian Orthodox Church
disagreed whether a contract they had enacted to guide their transition to
reunify remained in effect. Nearly lost in the conflict was the bishop whom
the local diocese had allowed the Serbian Orthodox Church to appoint over
them, even though he was a focal point of the lawsuit. The bishop had been
appointed in accordance with a provision contained in the transitional
contract, and the local diocese did not dispute the legitimacy of the
appointment, even though the appointment occurred at a time it would later
conclude must have fallen after the transitional contract had expired.
The majority in Puskar held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did
not apply because the transitional contract had expired, and thus the former
affiliate and the Serbian Orthodox Church were separate and distinct
organizations. The dissent in Puskar would have applied the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine due to the inherently religious questions the court faced.
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s matter of fact holding that the
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transitional contract had expired, and instead focused on what appeared to
be sufficient evidence that the former affiliate and the Serbian Orthodox
Church had either reunified or remained under the transitional contract.
This Note analyzes Puskar in comparison to other Illinois appellate court
cases, and concludes that Puskar’s dissenting position was more correct to
reach its determination.

Gone Fishing: Angling for an Answer to Asian Car Migration After the
Seventh Circuit’s Refusal to Allow Hydrological Separation
Matthew A. Kratky ....................................................................................177
Asian carp are the latest addition to an extensive list of invasive species that
pollutes American waterways. But unlike other prominent invasive species,
Asian carp were intentionally brought into the United States to control algae
growth in Southern aquaculture ponds. Torrential flooding provided an
avenue for these fish to escape into the Mississippi River, and since then, the
Asian Carp have migrated northward into the Illinois River and the Chicago
Area Waterway System. Along the way, their incessant hunger and prolific
breeding habits have enabled Asian carp to monopolize food sources to the
detriment of native fish populations. Asian carp have now reached the
doorsteps of Lake Michigan, and while methods such as electric fences and
the application of poison have temporarily kept the fish out of Lake
Michigan, the expense and unreliable nature of these measures will prevent
their prolonged success. Once Asian carp breach Lake Michigan, these fish
will have a limitless conduit to enter the rest of the Great Lakes.
This Comment discusses the judicial and legislative actions taken in
response to the looming threat Asian carp pose to the Great Lakes.
Specifically, this Comment addresses how the recent or proposed actions
taken to stop the Asian carp migration are either infeasible or ineffective.
This Comment argues that the most advocated solution, hydrological
separation, which involves permanently separating Lake Michigan from the
Chicago Area Waterway System and the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal,
would impose too great a burden on commercial navigability to be a viable
option. Despite the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to grant a permanent injunction
requiring hydrological separation in Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, state and federal agencies tasked with devising solutions to keep
Asian carp out of the Great Lakes remain fixated on hydrological separation.
Furthermore, this Comment will argue that besides from being impractical,
hydrological separation conflicts with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’
statutory duties to maintain navigable waterways, and without legislative
action, these waterways cannot be separated. This Comment argues that the
recently enacted Asian Carp Prevention and Control Act, as is, fails to either
prevent or control Asian carp from infesting Lake Michigan. This Comment
then proposes adopting a program currently used to combat another invasive
species, the pike minnow, in which fishermen are nominally paid for catching
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and removing Asian carp before they have an opportunity to enter Lake
Michigan.
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